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SociAL security and other general welfare measures have vitally
affected the American economy for more than a decade. The mere list-
ing of the more important of these measures is impressive: the emer-
gency unemployment relief activities-federal, state and local-from
1931 on; the emergency cashing of World War I adjusted-service
certificates in 1930 and 1931; the civil works (CWA), work projects
(VPA), and public works (PWA) activities-federal, state and local;
the expansion of public assistance, including general assistance on a
state and local basis, as well as aid to the aged, dependent children and
blind on a federal-state matching basis; and the social insurances, in-
cluding federal old-age and survivors insurance, federal-state unem-
ployment compensation and railroad retirement and unemployment
insurance. Many billions of dollars have been paid out under all these
programs combined since 1929, and many billions also have been col-lected in taxes to finance such programs. It is no exaggeration to say
that the social and economic conditions in the United States in the
1930s and 1940s would have been markedly different had these pro-
grams not been in operation.
Among all these various programs unemployment compensation has
had perhaps the most far-reaching economic effects. This is not be-
cause unemployment compensation has been throughout the years the
largest program in terms of expenditures (because it has not been), nor
because it touches more people (because it does not), nor because it has
been longer sustained (public assistance is much older). But unemploy-
ment compensation has other features which give it great weight as an
economic force: it is both a taxing program and a benefit payment
program; it is financed almost wholly by a payroll tax upon employers;
it has a system of experience rating which brings about variations in
employer taxes from state to state, industry to industry, and firm to
firm; its activities fluctuate with business conditions, not only in con-
tribution rates of employers but in benefit payments to the workers.
No other program is so sharply and quickly affected by economic
conditions, and in turn so directly affects the Nation's economic life.
The unemployment compensation program (including the federal-
state system of unemployment compensation and railroad unemploy-
ment insurance) has been in operation since January 1936.1 From
t Director, Bureau of Employment Security, Social Security Board. The opinions
expressed are those of the writer and do not nece arily represent the views of the Social
Security Board.
1. In the State of Wisconsin an unemployment compensation la, was pas-sed in 1932,
collection of contributions began in July 1934, vith benefits first payable in July 1936. The
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January 1, 1936, to June 30, 1945, the unemployment compensation
system has collected a total of $9 billions in taxes, has paid out $2.2
billions in benefits, and had reserves as of June 30, 1945, of approxi-
mately $7 billions. In the year 1944, about 31 million workers were
employed in an average week in industries covered by unemployment
compensation laws (including railroad); about 47 million workers
earned some wage credits during the year, of whom about 38 million
workers earned enough to be eligible for benefits if they became un-
employed. The purpose of this paper is to review very sketchily and
summarily some of the major economic effects of this program.
ECONOIIC EFFECTS OF THE TAXING PROGRAIM
As stated above, unemployment compensation is both a taxing and a
benefit payment program. In fact, the federal law is primarily a taxing
statute. Furthermore, because of the provisions for building up re-
serves in advance of benefit payments, the program began operations as
a taxing program and continued solely on that basis for some time; it
was not until July 1939 that all states were actually paying unem-
ployment benefits. Finally, the occurrence of the war, with consequent
prosperity and full employment, has again focused attention almost
wholly on the taxing aspects of the program. It can truly be said that
the benefit payment potentialities of the program have not so far even
been tested. For these reasons it seems appropriate to begin with an
analysis of the economic effects of the taxing program, leaving to the
end the somewhat more speculative analysis of benefit payments and
their influence upon the economy.
The current methods of financing utiemployment compensation are
the product of several divergent influences or factors. Chief among
these are the influences inherent in the nature of the federal-state sys-
tem established under the Social Security Act of 1935. The excise tax
imposed by that act was not a tax to raise revenue for the payment of
benefits to unemployed workers but an incentive tax, which was de-
signed to encourage state legislatures to adopt unemployment com-
pensation laws and impose taxes to meet the costs of the benefits. The
character of the tax, however, was such that it set the pattern of financ-
ing adopted by the states when they passed their unemployment
compensation laws.
The federal tax was and continues to be a 3 percent tax on payrolls. 2
Railroad Insurance Act was passed in 1938 when the railroad industry was removed from
coverage of the state unemployment compensation acts and a special unemployment in.
surance system created for that one industry.
2. The act provided for a 1 percent tax in 1936, a 2 percent tax in 1937, and a 3 per-
cent tax for succeeding years. The railroad tax act also provided for a 3 percent payroll
tax on railroads beginning in July 1939, and continuing to the present time. This tax differs
somewhat from the social security tax in that it is collected by the Railroad Retirement
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The device used to encourage states to pass unemployment compensa-
tion laws was the credit allowed the individual taxpayer if he paid
taxes under such a state law. The maximum credit allowable was
90 percent of the 3 percent, or 2.7 percent of the taxable payroll. This
tax offset provision was effective immediately. Another provision,
which was not to take effect until benefit payments were well under
way, permitted the allowance of additional credit if an employer had
been assessed less than the 2.7 percent under experience-rating provi-
sions which met the requirements of the federal act.
The choice of an employer tax on payrolls and the provision for
experience rating largely grew out of concepts taken over from work-
men's compensation. 3 At the time the federal act and the state laws
were enacted these concepts were generally accepted as applicable to
unemployment compensation. Under those laws employers carry the
full cost of accident insurance for their workers. The employer's pay-
roll is used to determine the extent of exposure to such accidents, and
contributions are collected on the payroll at rates which vary with the
degree of the accident risk among industries and employers. These
ideas were carried over into state unemployment compensation laws in
the form of an employer payroll tax with provision for subsequent rate
variations. This pattern was the direct result of the federal act and
the theories which had gone into the drafting of the act.
The system did not in itself provide any place for employee con-
tributions or government contributions in the financing of benefits. In
the light of the major federal objective, there seemed no point in assess-
ing employee contributions through the federal government. The
inequity of taxing employees in a state which might not even have an
unemployment compensation law was readily apparent. -Moreover,
there is an essential incompatibility between the theory which supports
variable rates for employers and the theory which justifies a contribu-
tory unemployment insurance system supported jointly by workers
and employers. On the other hand, the system did leave the way open
for employee contributions, and for government contributions also,
if the states wished to have them. Ten states at one time or another
assessed employee contributions, but in only four 4 do these still exist.
If a lower rate of employer contribution had been established under
the federal act, or if unemployment had been more severe in the years
since the act was passed, the employer contribution alone might not
have proved adequate. In those circumstances it is possible that either
Board rather than the United States Treasury, and it is used to pay unemployment bcnefits
specified in the railroad unemployment insurance act. The railroad system differ. ezenn-
tially from the federal-state system in that it provides a national system of taxes and benefits
for a specific industry. Also, it is a uniform tax wNith no provision for experience rating.
3. See Arnold, Experietce Rafing, page 218 infra, at 220.
4. Alabama, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
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employee contributions or government contributions, or both, would
have been incorporated in the present system of unemployment com-
pensation. The District of Columbia law, as initially passed by the
Congress, did provide for government contributions during the first
years of the program. 5
Neither employee nor government contributions have become an
essential feature of the program, however. The character of the federal
act is not alone responsible for this; more fundamental is the fact that
employer contributions have been more than adequate in all states to
finance the benefits that have been payable during the past eight years.
The first important objective of this federal tax offset provision was
to stimulate passage of state unemployment compensation laws with
state taxing provisions and state benefit schedules.' There was in the
beginning considerable doubt about the constitutionality of federal
unemployment insurance legislation.7 It was feared by the Committee
on Economic Security that if the unemployment compensation program
established by the Act were to be made wholly dependent upon federal
law, the whole program would be eliminated by unfavorable court
action. On the other hand, if federal action consisted simply of taxa-
tion which would stimulate the passage of state laws, the program as a
whole would become firmly embedded in state legislation and might
survive even though the federal law should be declared invalid by the
Supreme Court. Some opinion was expressed at that time to the effect
that the tax offset program would not result in the widespread passage
of state laws, and that therefore this first objective would not be at-
tained. In actual fact, this fear soon proved to be unfounded. Long
before the Supreme Court had passed judgment on the legislation, most
states had passed laws, and by May 1937, when the Court decision was
rendered, 45 states had laws on the statute books. The remaining three
states came into the program prior to July 1, 1937. The first objective
was therefore attained completely within a period of two and one-half
years.
5. Section 5 of the 1935 law, 49 STAT. 949 (1935), provided: "(a) The District of
Columbia shall pay contributions, in addition to its contributions as an employer, in the
following amounts: For the calendar year 1936, $100,000; for the calendar year 1937, $125,-
000; and for the calendar year 1938, $175,000. (b) The contributions required by thls sec-
tion for each calendar year shall be paid by the District of Columbia to the Board and
shall, immediately upon receipt by the Board, be paid into the District Unemployment
Fund." The section was repealed, effective July 1, 1943. §ee 57 STAT. 100 (1943).
6. For a more complete discussion see CoMzerrr: ON EcoNobic SECURITY, SOCIAL
SECURITY IN AbMRICA (Social Security Board, 1937) ;¢LEvERETT S. LYON, VICTOR ABRAM-
SON, et al., GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE: DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ISSUES Or
AmERICAN PUBLIC POLICY (Brookings Institution, 1940) 2 vols. See also Unemploymctti
Compensation in SOCIAL WORK YEARBOOK: 1941 at 576-7, and SOCIAL WORK YEARBOOK:
1943 at 531-9.
7. The unemployment compensation features of the Social Security Act were declared
constitutional by a 5-4 vote of the Supreme Court in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548 (May 24, 1937).
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The second, longer-range objective of the federal tax was the elimina-
tion, or at least the restriction, of interstate competition with respect to
unemployment compensation legislation. The federal tax was uniform
for all employers and all industries affected by it. During the initial
years at least, employers in like circumstances anywhere in the country
were subject to the same tax rate, and the offset provision insured that
employers in a state with an unemployment compensation Iaw need
not pay higher rates than employers in a neighboring state without such
a law. All employers covered under the Act paid the same rates; all
industries were on an equal footing." It is vitally important to empha-
size that this elimination of inter-state competition was originally the
cornerstone of the present federal-state system of unemployinent
compensation. It was this which made possible the rapid spread of the
program throughout the states and which insured the maintenance and
expansion of the program during the early years of its existence.
Apart from the general taxing provisions of the Act, there was one
other provision which played a minor part in lessening competition
among the States. Under the Act, the Federal government pays all the
cost of administering State unemployment compensation laws. Be-
cause of this responsibility, the tax offset was limited to 90 percent of
the 3 percent tax. The remaining 10 percent portion of the federal tax
is collected by the federal government as general revenue. Congress in
turn appropriates the necessary funds which are allotted to the states
as administrative grants. This 0.3 percent tax is uniform for all em-
ployers in states. Therefore, any differences in administrative costs
among the states do not reflect themselves in varying tax burdens
upon employers in those states.
VARIATIONS IN RATES BETWEEN EMPLOYERS
During the first five years of operation (1936-1940) the unemploy-
ment compensation program developed in accordance with its original
objectives; the next five years, however, were characterized by the
rapid spread of experience rating until, as of June 30, 1945, all but six
states had experience-rating laws on the statute books, and all but nine
had schedules of reduced rates in actual operation. The effect of experi-
8. A question has been raised as to whether the payroll tax is in fact truly uniform
for all industries and all employers inasmuch as it falls more heavily upon those industries
and firms employing relatively large amounts of labor; in such industries payroll costs con-
stitute a high proportion of operating costs, thus causing employers in those industries to
pay more unemployment compensation taxes than those employers having low labor costs.
It has been further contended that in some industries employers could readily pass on the
tax to consumers as part of the cost of production, while in others this is difficult or im-
possible. Nevertheless, making allowance for whatever imperfections there may be in a
payroll tax, the principle is clear: the risk of unemployment is directly associated with the
number of workers employed; the tax falls uniformly upon the wages paid to those workers.
The first incidence of the tax is, therefore, reasonable.
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ence rating has been to change the original idea of tax uniformity into a
highly complex system of tax variation. The experience rates in unem-
ployment compensation are determined upon an individual employer
basis in each state; the rate schedules usually contain numerous classes
of rates; and rates are redetermined every year. As a result, the out-
standing fact about unemployment compensation taxes is that they
fluctuate from year to year, and may be widely different for firms in the
same industry in the same state, or even for the same firm operating in
the same industry in different states. It is said that one of the vitally
important characteristics of a good tax is certainty; by this criterion
alone this is not a good tax for its outstanding characteristic is its
uncertainty.
It is curious that the essential inconsistency between this system of
experience rating and certain basis objectives of the unemployment
compensation program was not at first generally recognized. During
the House Ways and Means Committee hearings in 1935, the Hon. Jere
Cooper called attention to the possibility that the variations in em-
ployer tax rates under such plans might lead to general reductions in
rates which would leave some employers in some states more favorably
situated than others, but the warning was not heededY There were
several reasons for this. First, the unemployment experience of the
country during the 1920s and early 1930s made it seem likely that the
3 percent payroll tax would, if anything, be insufficient for an adequate
unemployment compensation program. It was thought that the states
might be concerned more with devising additional sources of revenue,
such as employee contributions, than with cutting employer rates.
Second, the experience rating was designed to work both ways: to
lower the rates of those employers who had a favorable experience with
unemployment, and to raise the rates for those whose experience was
unfavorable. Thus in Wisconsin the state tax ranges from a minimum
of 0.0 percent for employers with large reserves to 4.0 percent for those
with impaired or non-existent reserves. ° While it was not likely that
the higher tax rates from the penalty contribution rates would always
exactly balance the lowered rates from the reduced rates, it was at least
likely that such a spread in rates would prove to be a stabilizing factor
in maintaining an average contribution rate for the state as a whole
not too far above or below 2.7 percent.
Several factors combined to bring about a fundamental change in
thinking and in action. By far the most important of these was the
great business revival, culminating in the national defense program and
eventually in the war itself, which reduced benefit payments to in-
9. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 4120, 74 Cong., 1st Ses,
(1935) 145-7.
10. For "var-risk" provisions of the Wisconsin law see page 66 infra,
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significant levels. Moreover, the enlarged payrolls of the prosperity
period brought in greatly increased revenue.
For the unemployment compensation program as a whole, and even
more spectacularly for individual states, current income of the fund was
increased, current outgo was sharply reduced, and greater reserves were
piled up; by 1944 for the country as a whole the interest earned on the
reserves was far in excess of all benefit payments for the year. This
favorable financial development had two immediate consequences:
first, many states which had not previously done so adopted plans for
experience rating; and, second, states which had already adopted expe-
rience rating modified their previous plans or changed their schedules of
rates. Experience rating as a system of taxation was the sole bene-
ficiary of this situation because there was no other method of obtaining
tax reduction. A uniform or flat rate reduction from the standard 2.7
percent tax rate on individual employers could not be adopted be-
cause the federal act requires that rate reductions be based on in-
dividual employer experience. Congressional action would have been
necessary to make flat reduction possible. Hence, a number of state
governments, which might have preferred to effect a tax readjustment
through a uniform reduction in all employer rates, were unable to do so.
The logical conclusion which must follow from the present system is
that all states able to finance a reasonably adequate program on less
than 2.7 percent will eventually adopt some form of experience rating.
The second consequence was that states amended their experience-
rating provisions by eliminating penalty rates and making the standard
rate of 2.7 percent the maximum rate. Not only did this dampen the
opposition to experience rating on the part of employers who otherwise
would have paid higher rates, but it also had the effect of lowering the
average yield in the state well below 2.7 percent. States without
previous experience-rating plans refused to consider the penalty rates
as a part of such plans. As of June 30, 1945, of 45 state laws embodying
experience-rating systems 1117 made provision for penalty rates.'"
Therefore, experience rating, which started out as a device for spread-
ing employer contribution rates both above and below the normal
rate of 2.7 percent, is gradually becoming simply a device for reducing
contribution rates below the normal rate. Of course, there is still a
spreading of the rates, but the range is narrower, and the concept of a
penalty rate is dying out. The range is, in fact, too narrow to reflect
adequately the differences in the experience of individual employers
with unemployment.
The consequences of these developments in experience rating can be
11. Including Nevada and New York, effective July 1, 1945.
12. Including Nevada, effective July 1, 1945.
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summarized very simply by an illustration from a group of neighboring
Middle Atlantic states:
Average Contribu.
Range of Individ- tion Rate for
val Entployer State as a Whole,
Rates (percent) Z944 (percent)
Connecticut ' 1.5-2.7 2.1
New York (no experience rating) 14 2.7 2.7
New Jersey (not including 1.0 em-
ployee contribution) 0.9-3.6 1.8
Pennsylvania 1.0-2.7 1.5
Delaware 0.5-3.0 0.8
Here are five states in reasonably close business competition with each
other, yet the percentage over-all yield in New York was more than
three times the percentage yield in Delaware, while some New York
employers may be paying five or six times the rates of their competitors
in'Delaware'iS
As we look back over the history of unemployment compensation
during the ten years since the passage of the Social Security Act, we
can readily see that objectives have become distorted and unforeseen
results have occurred. Uniformity of tax rates has given way to varia-
tions and fluctuations. Variations in rates among employers (experi-
ence rating) have become hopelessly entangled with tax reductions
arising from general economic conditions. It is interesting to speculate
on the situation in which unemployment compensation would find it-
self today if there had been no provision for experience rating. In that
event the issue of tax reduction would have had to be faced clearly at
the federal level, as it has been faced in federal OASI. Each year, dur-
ing recent years at least, the amount of the uniform federal unemploy-
ment compensation tax rate would have been an issue in Congress with
the result that it would have been debated on its own merits. In actual
fact, however, tax reduction has been forced into the mold of experience
rating by the additional credit provisions in the federal act. The extent
13. Connecticut and Pennsylvania vary experience-rating schedules with the condition
of the fund.
14. In April 1945 New York adopted an experience-rating system under which rates
are based on the employer's experience with yearly and quarterly payroll declines, modified
by the number of years (up to eight) the employer has been liable for contributions under
the state law.
15. A note of caution is in order here. Of course, there are many firms and industries
which are in a non-competitive position from state to state, e.g., retail stores and local public
utilities. These are scarcely affected by the differences in payroll tax rates. Furthermore,
these differences in taxes may be small in comparison to variations in other costs. Firms
operating on narrow margins and which sell their products in interstate commerce are the
ones which will feel the greatest effect of these rate differentials.
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to which this anomaly can exist is dramatized by the rates in the Dis-
trict of Columbia for 1945. While new firms must pay the 2.7 percent
standard rate, the experience-rated firms (comprising 66 percent of all
active accounts in the District) have rates varying from 0.1 percent to
2.7 percent with 89 percent of the subject payroll taxed at the 0.1 per-
cent rate.
Conversely, experience rating itself is becoming distorted by being
used as a vehicle for tax reduction. In all truth, the friends of experi-
ence rating can say that that system has not yet had a fair trial. The
fundamental purpose of experience rating -as to stimulate stability
of employment by awarding lowered rates to employers who succeeded
in achieving that objective. Employer rates have been drastically
reduced in many states throughout the country in the last three years,
yet the fact is that employers generally have had very little control
over their respective businesses during the past five years; nor do expe-
rience rates reflect to any appreciable degree the efforts of individual
employers to stabilize their employment. Yet experience rating has,
in the eyes of many employers, obtained the full credit for the reduc-
tions in rates which have so far occurred, and it is likely that the system
will suffer the discredit of being held responsible for the rising rates in
the postwar period, during which, also, employers generally will be at
the mercy of influences beyond their control.
WVhile experience rating has been the means of getting rate varia-
tions, these variations do not accurately reflect the true purpose of
experience rating. They partly represent what might be called almost
purely arbitrary influences upon the employers' costs of production.
Ignoring the present wartime situation and looking to the longer future,
we can say that, under the present federal-state unemployment com-
pensation system, the rates which an employer must pay will be deter-
mined by three factors: (1) the relative amount of unemployment in
each state as compared to other states; (2) the comparative liberality of
the various state laws, and the policies which the state agencies follow
in the administration of those laws; and (3) the type of experience rat-
ing adopted, including the methods used in measuring the experience
of employers with unemployment, and the methods of assigning rates
on the basis of that experience. These factors, while they can be dis-
tinguished from one another, do not operate independently of each
other; there is considerable interaction among them, especially between
the second and third.
Unquestionably, all three of these factors making for rate variation
can operate in strictly economic fashion on an employer's business. In a
state where industries are more unstable and unemployment is likely
to be heavy, unemployment compensation will require higher rates of
payroll taxes on employers than in a neighboring state where indus-
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tries are generally more stable. For example, Michigan and Pennsyl-
vania would, on past experience at least, require higher tax rates than
Ohio and Wisconsin. Likewise, under identical circumstances it pre-
sumably costs more to finance higher benefits for longer periods of
time; therefore a state which has a low schedule of benefits and short
duration may require lower taxes than one which has a more liberal
law. Finally, if experience rating is to achieve the purpose for which it
was designed, it should produce lower rates for the stabilized employer
having few layoffs and force higher rates on the unstable employer
with a large labor turnover. Due to the wartime conditions which
have existed since 1940, the possibilities of experience rating in this
connection have never yet been really tested and cannot be until
sometime in the longer future when more "normal" conditions may
exist. 16
However, this is only half the story. The differences in the legal
provisions of state experience-rating laws frequently have no economic
basis and are often quite erratic in their economic consequences. One
outstanding example is the variety of methods used to identify the
employer who should be held responsible for a worker's unemploy-
ment. This has been a thorny problem and illustrates one of the diffi-
culties in the attempt to adapt the merit-rating system of workmen's
compensation to the purposes of unemployment insurance. Under
workmen's compensation laws the employer to whom a worker is at-
tached is clearly identified since the injury to be compensated occurs
during the period of employment; that is, the employer-employee
relationship exists at the moment of the accident. In unemployment
compensation, however, the contingency does not occur simultaneously
with the employment but only after the employer-employee relation-
ship has been brbken off. Except in cases of partial or very temporary
unemployment, the unemployment of the individual worker occurs
after he has severed his connection with all employers. As a result there
is no one method of determining which of a worker's prior employers
should be held responsible for his unemployment. A wide variety of
methods, with numerous variations, are used in making "charges"
against an employer's experience-rating record." For the purposes of
this article the significant point is that these different methods bring
about very different results in terms of the payroll tax rate.
It is usually argued that while these charging methods may cause
variations in tax rates that are highly uneven and erratic in detail, they
balance out fairly well in the long run. At one time the "last" employer
may find himself saddled with a heavy burden of charges because a
particular ex-employee drew benefits at a certain time; in another case
16. See Arnold, Experience Rating, page 218 infra, at 237.
17. Seeid. at 234-5.
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he will be more fortunate and find that some other employer has
borne the whole charge. In some measure this argument is valid;
among millions of employees and hundreds of thousands of employers
there is some "evening up" as among these different systems, so that
they are not as far apart in their effects as might appear in individual
cases. The main weakness of the argument is that it proves too much.
There are very decided limits to this "evening up." For example, a
small employer with a few employees lacks the advantage of a large
employer with thousands of employees. For this small employer, a few
unfortunate charges may keep up his rate for years. Again, certain
industries may find themselves heavily burdened with charges under
one system which they would scarcely feel at all under another system.
This is probably not yet realized by employers generally, but the fact
is that the charging process in vogue in a particular state may have fully
as much to do with an employer's rate as the actual extent of unemploy-
ment among his ex-employees.
Finally, interstate concerns will find that the personnel policies
which will avoid benefit charges in one State may be exactly opposite
to the policies which will be necessary in the neighboring State in order
to achieve the same result. In one state a short general layoff fol-
lowed by reemployment of the men may be the best way to avoid
heavy benefit charges; in another state this may be the worst thing
that could be done. In some states credit is given for rehiring former
employees, so that the employer may gain lower rates by looking up
his ex-employees who are drawing benefits and rehiring them in prefer-
ence to other workers; in other states such a policy has no effect what-
ever on his rate.
Thus the variations in employer tax rates for unemployment com-
pensation are due in part to the operation of several economic factors
to which a business concern presumably could adapt in the long run.
However, these variations are multiplied by the operation of non-
economic factors of an erratic character, factors to which it would be
difficult for the average concern to adapt. The conclusion must be
that in the light of the economic conditions of the past five years, and
in terms of the complexities of experience-rating as it now exists, the
average employer's tax rate in unemployment compensation is now
largely the result of fortuitous factors which affect his business in ways
which he can neither understand nor overcome.
In the postwar period a determined effort is to be made to stimulate
small businesses and new businesses. This is a cardinal policy of the
federal government. It is especially significant in the case of ex-
servicemen who will be enabled to borrow capital to finance new enter-
prises. These new concerns will be required to pay for a period of
3 years the standard rate of 2.7 percent while many of their older
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competitors, enjoying the low rates of wartime prosperity, may be
paying rates of 1.0 percent, 0.5 percent, or even less. This may under
certain conditions constitute a differential in taxes sufficiently great to
affect to some extent the chances of the new firms for survival. This
adverse effect could be eliminated if a revised uniform tax rate were
assessed on all employers (which would mean the abolition of experience
rating), or if the standard rate were lowered, with effective experience
rates established above and below the standard. A lower tax rate for
new businesses is one of the urgent reasons for reconsidering the
financing of unemployment compensation. Needless to say, the old-age
and survivors insurance tax rate is not subject to this criticism.
Fluctuations in Rates over Periods of Time.
The variations in rates discussed so far are those which are current
among states and among employers. This is in a sense a static analysis
of rate variation. If we now introduce the element of time, we find that
there exists another type of variation, possibly even more important
from the point of view of the economy as a whole. This is the general
variation in rates which occurs from year to year or from period to
period. Regardless of whether or not we can establish the doctrine of a
periodic business cycle, we do know that there are fluctuations in busi-
ness conditions, so that at times business is good and unemployment is
low, while at other times business is bad and unemployment is high.
For example, in 1940 the entire system paid out $518.7 millions in
benefits, while in 1944 it paid out only $62.4 millions. In some post-
war year it could pay out several billions of dollars. In view of the
fact that unemployment compensation is designed to offset the effects
of loss of jobs, it is natural that the benefit payments will fluctuate
widely from time to time.
One problem of financing involves the question of how we should
arrange the contributions of the employers to meet benefit costs. The
theory which was adopted in this country in the passage of the Social
Security Act was that reserves for unemployment compensation should
be set aside in advance. The original act provided, in effect, that
reserves on hand at the beginning of benefit payments should be at
least equal to one full year's contributions at the 2.7 percent rate. In
addition, it was expected that additional reserves would be built up in
subsequent years so that ample funds would be set aside to meet any
contingency. No provision was made for borrowing. This doctrine of
reserves has been carried so far that twelve states have provided for
reductions in benefits whenever reserves fall below a certain point,
Most states make experience rate reduction contingent upon the condi-
tion of the reserve.
In actual historical fact, no state suffered insolvency in the first year
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of benefit payments, and in only a few states paying benefits in 1938 was
it necessary to draw at all on the reserves which had been established
before benefit payments began. In the vast majority of states the
contribution system yielded more current income than was necessary
to pay the benefits provided by law. Historically, the unemploy-
ment compensation system in this country has turned out to be over-
financed. In all but a few states, reserves have been accumulated 13
which are ample to pay off for some years to come all the benefits
payable under present laws, and even the much higher benefits which
might be desirable. This is one factor which hastened the adoption of
experience rating throughout the country.
If the federal act had provided an offset at a uniform fixed rate for
all employers, there would have been an automatic adjustment between
the amount of unemployment tax collections and the amount of bene-
fits payable prospectively over a period of years. WXith a fixed rate
applied to a tax base which automatically fluctuates with business con-
ditions, i.e., the payroll, the unemployment funds would have benefited
from increased revenue in periods of business activity and employers
would have paid less in taxes during periods of recession, with the
result that a more consistent relationship would have been established
between income and potential liability. When payrolls increase the
number of individuals with benefit rights increases, and a sound system
of finance should provide for increase in revenue.
When both rates and payroll fluctuate, as under the present system,
the financial result is unpredictable. The effect of rate reductions on
the income may be lessened or aggravated by changes in payroll. The
effect upon income is the same if the rate is reduced from 2 to 1 percent
as it would be if the taxable payroll were cut in half. Obviously, if both
the rate and the taxable payroll are reduced by 50 percent at the same
time, the income is lowered to one-fourth of its prior level. On the
other hand, if the rate is reduced and the payroll increases sufficiently,
the former level of income can be maintained or increased. In any case
the result cannot be accurately forecast.
The picture is further complicated by the form and variety of in-
dexes which have been adopted by the states for the purpose of estab-
lishing the relative experience of employers with unemployment, and
the variety of the methods used in assigning rates on the basis of the
index. Under the reserve-ratio system, the benefits which are paid to
his workers are subtracted from the contributions paid by an employer
and the balance is compared with his payroll to establish his reserve
18. Many states had accumulated more than the equivalent of 2.7 percent of payoll
before they began. paying benefits; for example, Illinois and Montana had accumulated the
equivalent of 6.75 percent of payroll.
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ratio. 9 If his payroll increases more rapidly than the reserve, his
reserve will fall and his tax rate will increase. Under other plans, the
opposite is true. For example, under the benefit-ratio plan benefits
paid to the employer's workers are compared directly with his payroll.
If the payroll rises, the ratio is lowered and the employer receives a
lower rate. Under the reserve-ratio system the pull of an increasing
payroll is in the direction of higher rates; under the benefit-ratio, in the
direction of lower rates.
Another formula bases the long-run financing of the program upon
the "replenishment" theory of contributions. Under this system the
rates of individual employers are designed to bring in the amount
necessary to replenish the fund for any outgo due to benefit payments.
In its extreme form, this method replenishes each year the amount
expended in the preceding year. The amount is distributed among
employers in accordance with their relative experience with separated
workers who have drawn benefits. If the amount to be raised is large,
each employer will carry a heavier tax burden. At present, with pros-
perity at a high level and benefit payments almost negligible, con-
tribution rates of employers are at a minimum. With the first shock of
postwar unemployment, benefit payments will multiply and the
amount to be raised by the employers will increase. If the tax on the
covered payrolls is to yield the needed amount, rates will have to be
substantially increased since declining payrolls will throw the burden
of the increase on the rate.
While the formulas in some states, notably those using the reserve-
ratio, greatly modify this effect, an almost inescapable result of basing
future rates on the experience of employers with unemployment in the
recent past is that the rate will be low'during and immediately follow-
ing periods of sustained prosperity and high during periods of con-
tinued depression. When business conditions show abrupt changes,
the situation may differ. Rates in the first year or two of a depression
may be low if the depression follows a period of extensive employment.
Clearly, those state laws which base rates on experience over a long
period are less erratic in this respect. However, even in these states,
the experience of the war years with their abnormal employment and
negligible benefit payments so far outweighs the experience of the
earlier years in which the program was in operation that the employers
generally are paying contributions at a relatively low rate. State
administrators have become aware of this development, and in some
instances have persuaded state legislatures to take action to counteract
it. In Wisconsin, for example, a general levy of 0.5 percent was as-
sessed on all employers in 1944 and 1945 for the purpose of creating an
19. For a more extended discussion of these systems see Arnold, Experience Ralitg,
page 218 infra, at 229-230.
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extra postwar reserve. 2 In the same state special increased rates were
assessed on war-expanded industries whose risks of shutdown in the
postwar period were thought to be greater than average. Eleven 21
other states have adopted similar "war-risk" provisions.
A temporary step to meet postwar emergencies has been taken by the
federal government. Under the George Act, passed in 1944, provision
was made for the maintenance, during the period July 1, 1945-Octo-
ber 1, 1947, of a federal unemployment account in the United States
Treasury. During the years July 1, 1945-July 1, 1947, states are en-
titled to borrow from the account when their own unemployment
reserves are less than the equivalent of a year's contributions. 22 This
is not a reinsurance fund, but an advance, without interest. The
amount of the advance is limited to cover the cost of those benefits
in any calendar quarter which are in excess of 2.7 percent of the state's
taxable payroll, and must be repaid when the state's account has
again risen to the required level.
There is much to be said for introducing the concept of borroving
in the financing of the unemployment compensation program. If a
state has the possibility of borrowing, there is less urgency about the
creation of a large reserve in advance; at least, there is no need for the
maintenance of an excessive reserve. Reduction of benefits to unem-
ployed workers in the midst of depression, simply because the reserve
has been temporarily exhausted, is a most unwise social policy; it
should be adopted only in dire emergency and as a last resort. It should
be possible to finance unemployment compensation on a reasonable
20. A 1945 amendment to the Wisconsin act provides that, effective in 1947, 0.5 percent
will be added to an employer's tax whenever his payroll has increased 20 percent or more
over the payroll in the prior year.
21. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, ,iMzouri,
Ohio, and Oklahoma. The provisions in Georgia and Kansas were adopted during the 1945
legislative sessions.
22. Section 1201 of the Act, 58 STAT. 790 (1944), 50 U.S.C. app. § 1667 (Supp. 1944),
provides:
"(a) In the event that the balance in a State's account in the Unemployment
Trust Fund on June 30, 1945, or on the last day in any ensuing calendar quarter
which ends prior to July 1, 1947, does not exceed a sum equal to the total contribu-
tions deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund under the unemployment com-
pensation law of the State during that one of the two calendar years next preceding
such day in which such deposits were higher ....
"(c) Any amount transferred to the account of any State under this section
shall be treated as an ad-ance, without interest, to the unemployment fund of Euch
State and shall be repaid to the Federal unemployment account from the unem-
ployment fund of that State to the extent that the balance in the State's account in
the Unemployment Trust Fund at the end of any calendar quarter, exceeds a sum
equal to the total contributions deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund under
the unemployment compensation law of the State during that one of the two calen-
dar years next preceding such day in which such deposits were higher .... #
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basis throughout the whole business cycle without the danger that the
entire program of benefits will be upset because at some given period of
time there is a temporary shortage of funds. Moreover, a system of
combining reserves and loans as a means of financing the unemploy-
ment compensation program has a further advantage over the straight
reserve plan. Since it is extremely difficult to tell in advance what the
compensation demands of the future will be, it is well to have a general
contingent fund from which states can borrow.
So far as tax policy is concerned, the developments of the last five
years are unfortunate in one respect at least-attention has been
centered upon individual employer rates instead of upon the over-all
statewide yield. Had flat-rate reductions been possible, some states in
recent years might have adopted uniform rates of less than 2.7 percent
rather than experience rating. Had they done so, more attention might
have been paid to the basic problem of the financing of the states'
unemployment benefits as a whole, and particularly to the financing
over longer periods of time. As it is, the concentration upon rates
geared to the experience of the individual employer has diverted the
-attention of employers from the central financing problem. The results
will probably not become apparent to employers generally until the
unemployment of the postwar period focuses sharp attention. upon
benefit costs.
EcONOMIc EFFECTS OF THE BENEFIT PROGRAM
Thus far attention has been centered upon the economic effects of
the tax rates in unemployment compensation. These are important;
they affect the cost of production of individual businesses and they
operate with differing effects upon different industries and upon differ-
ent States. The other side of the economic picture is the flow of benefit
payments to unemployed workers. How does this affect the economy?
Benefit Payments and Purchasing Power.
Supporters of the "spending" theory of prosperity would defend the
payment of unemployment benefits but would deplore their inad-
equacy. By no stretch of the imagination can unemployment benefits
be regarded as a substitute for full-time wages. Weekly benefit pay-
ments at best run only about 50 to 60 percent of wages while, for the
higher wage workers, weekly benefits may be as low as a third or a
quarter of wages. An extremely rough calculation made in the Bureau
of Employment Security indicates that for the year 1944 the average
benefits paid would have been about one-third of average wages in the
states.
Moreover, the duration of unemployment compensation is limited.
In some states workers can draw benefits for possibly 20-26 weeks, but
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in the majority for less than 20 weeks. When a worker exhausts his
unemployment rights, he can no longer draw from the fund. Coverage
is limited, so much so that approximately one-third of the persons gain-
fully employed in the country during a year have no rights at all, while
many additional workers who are eligible for benefits have only very
limited rights. Summing up all these factors, it has been shown that in
a moderately serious postwar reconversion year, when the decline from
present levels in the wages and salaries of American workers might
amount to $20-25 billions, the unemployment compensation system
might pay out something approaching $2-3 billions, only 10 percent. It
would be difficult "to spend our way into prosperity" through unem-
ployment compensation.
Furthermore, it is not the gross benefit payments which affect pur-
chasing power, but the net payments over and above taxes currently
collected. Even while large sums are being paid out in benefits during
a business depression, considerable amounts are flowing in from the
payroll tax. In 1944, total taxable payrolls for unemployment com-
pensation amounted to more than $60 billions, which yielded $1.15 bil-
lions in taxes with a Nationwide average effective rate of 1.9 percent.
If, in some reconversion period, such payrolls fell to $40 billions, the
standard rate of 2.7 percent would yield nearly $1.1 billions in taxes.
This does not mean that unemployment compensation benefit pay-
ments have no economic effect. Within their limits they do serve as an
element of purchasing power which practically all economists would
agree is both important and timely. It is timely because unemploy-
ment compensation payments are made early in the downturn, imme-
diately after unemployment makes its appearance. They enable
workers and their families to preserve existing assets, such as homes,
furniture, and automobiles, thus avoiding the forced liquidation of
assets which aggravates the downturn in business. They encourage
more confident spending of other resources, thus helping to avoid a
"freezing" of purchasing power on the part of millions of workers when
they are faced with unemployment. Payments are made weekly (in one
state, bi-weekly) very much like wages, so that there is not a sudden
lump-sum amount which may be spent erratically by the family, but
instead a steady assured (though low) income for a period of four to
six months. This means that these funds are ordinarily spent for the
basic necessities of life and furnish purchasing power for the products
of our basic industries, such as agriculture, food, and clothing. Benefits
are designed to cover no more than the period of unemployment; when
the unemployment is over and the worker has a job again, the pay-
ments cease. Finally, these benefit rights can be knovm to the worker
far in advance-he can know while he is working what his rights will
be in the event of unemployment. Therefore, they add to the security
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of employed workers and help maintain their spending habits at a time
when business may be heading down hill. In summary, therefore, it
may be said that these benefit payments have economic effects far
greater and more supporting to the economy .than their absolute
amounts would indicate.
Benefit Payments and the Labor Market.
It has occasionally been argued that the benefits payable in the form
of unemployment compensation operate as a drag upon the labor
market, encouraging workers to resist changes in occupations and
wage rates and hindering reemployment. These payments have occa-
sionally been labeled as pure economic waste, maintaining workers in
idleness when they would otherwise be earning wages at work. Is
there any evidence that this is the case?
On a broad, general basis the answer seems clearly to be, no. Such
views have usually arisen out of an ignorance of unemployment com-
pensation and how it works. In the first place, the unemployed worker
cannot obtain benefits for unemployment that is due to his having left
work by his own voluntary action (voluntary quit) or to a discharge
for misconduct, or if he is engaged in a labor dispute. In no case can
he obtain benefits until he registers at a public employment office, to
which he must return each week to put in his claim for benefits. Fur-
thermore, he can be disqualified and deprived of benefits if he refuses
any suitable work which may be offered to him through the employ-
ment office. Workers, therefore, cannot voluntarily retire to a state of
idleness and draw benefits; they cannot maintain a state of idleness
and continue to draw benefits if jobs are available. There may be
administrative failures here and there throughout a vast organization
stretching across the country, but these are the exception and not the
rule. Under the administration of unemployment compensation,
workers drawing benefits are generally doing so because (a) they have
been laid off by their employers and (b) no other jobs are available for
them.
In addition, the administration of unemployment compensation
serves a useful social purpose in providing a more effective nation-wide
organization of the labor market than would otherwise exist. In order
to obtain benefits the unemployed worker must maintain an active
registration for work at a local public employment office. These em-
ployment offices are welded together in a state-wide and a nation-wide
organization under the United States Employment Service. This
organization maintains a job clearance system which makes it possible
to refer orders for unfilled jobs from one city to another, or from one
part of the country to another. The payment of unemployment
benefits serves to bring into these offices all workers who have rights
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under the unemployment compensation system. Not only that, but
the administration of the system keeps these workers currently regis-
tered for as long as they hope to draw benefits. After that, such regis-
tration for work has become a habit, and the worker continues to visit
the office regularly. Furthermore, the success of the Employment
Service in finding jobs convinces the worker that he should keep in
touch with his local employment office .2
However, a case is sometimes made out against unemployment
compensation on the following grounds. Unemployed workers, no
matter how genuine their unemployment, are out of work because
there are no jobs available for them at their previous wages. They
must learn to accept this and make their readjustments accordingly.
The speediest reemployment and the quickest return to prosperity
would be assured if these workers were forced by economic necessity
to readjust their wage and skill demands and take whatever jobs they
can find at whatever wages they can get. This is the classical theory
of the deflation of the labor market in times of depression.
There is no space here to enter into a discussion of the further eco-
nomic consequences of such a policy, of the effect upon other wages
and the employment of other workers, and upon business itself. In-
stead, just one aspect of this argument will be examined here. It
seems clear that this thesis is based upon the assumption that the
economic interests of the community are best served by the speediest
possible reemployment of these workers at whatever wages and what-
ever skills they can find jobs. I believe that the economic interest of
the community in the short run may be exactly the opposite-i.e., to
give them time to find jobs at their former wages and with their former
skills. Among all the reasons which may be advanced for high pro-
ductivity for the American economy during the last four years of the
war, there is one which must not be overlooked, namely, the great
opportunity which workers throughout industry have had to choose
the work which they like best and can do best. Many workers begin-
ning at the bottom of the ladder a few years ago have risen to the
heights since that time. \Vhen we consider the large number of misfits
who exist in industry in normal times, we must realize that some of
these have been that way solely because of lack of opportunity. Of
course, there are still misfits in war industries, many thousands of them,
but the chances are that we have never had so many workers in this
23. During the war, when more manpower controls have been partially in effect, all
types of workers have been brought to the employment office, and the placements of the
United States Employment Service have soared to unprecedented levels. In normal pLace-
time operations, however, many employers operate their own perzonnel departments, many
unions continue to operate a placement system for their own members, and workers Eceh
jobs on their own account. In prewar days the Employment Service generally filled from
10 to 20 percent of the job openings occurring in the average local community.
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country engaged in work which they like and with opportunities for
rising as fast as their capacities will permit them.
What does a depression with forced unemployment do to such a
productive machine? All types of workers, both capable and incapable,
are thrown out of employment by the convulsions of an economy in
depression. True, those laid off are probably the least satisfactory
workers; this is certainly true, if the unemployment is moderate. But
the deeper and the more widespread the depression, the more complete
the shake-down of the labor force.
It is not good economics for the nation to have these workers forced
by family needs and other circumstances extraneous to the labor
market to take any jobs that are available. Workers with years of
experience at a skilled trade may find themselves forced by bitter
necessity to take an unskilled job. The result may be tremendous
losses in skills and marked increases in the number of misfits in the
productive labor force. It can be argued that ultimately the produc-
tivity of the nation will be higher if these workers and their families
have some carrying power which will enable them to obtain that
precious time necessary to enable them to find another opening at
their previouis level of skill and at something resembling their former
wages. The nation's productivity will be appreciably higher if that
result is achieved.
The e-inphasis in this argument is on the "short run." It is clear that
if these workers spend six months to a year looking for work in their
own trade without success, then some more fundamental readjustment
of the worker may be necessary. Trades and skills do disappear; work-
ers who have climbed the economic ladder often have to step down
and start up again. The function of unemployment compensation is to
give them short-run carrying power so that they may be able to pre-
serve, to the best of their ability, their skills and their earning power.
This is to the economic advantage of the nation as well as of the work-
ers and their families. On the other hand, when fundamental occupa-
tional readjustments have to be made, then unemployment compensa-
tion should be discontinued, or at least put on another basis, and the
workers encouraged and assisted to make such readjustments in their
working lives.
CONCLUSION
Unemployment compensation in the United States has a deeply
significant relationship to the American economy. It is financed al-
most entirely by a payroll tax on employers. The outstanding feature
of this tax is that it is variable in place and in time. Experience-rating
systems providing for varying rates of contributions on the part of
employers exist in 45 states. The outlook for the future is for continued
variation in unemployment compensation tax rates throughout the
country.
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This does not mean that the payroll tax, as such, is a bad tax for
unemployment compensation purposes. It is the nature of this par-
ticular payroll tax-its variability, its uncertainty, and its fluctuation
from year to year-which is breeding germs of trouble for business in
the years after the war when the rates may be increased and when busi-
ness is more completely on its own than at present. By contrast, the
federal old-age and survivors insurance rate has remained uniform for
all employers since the date it was first assessed on January 1, 1937,
and the rate itself has been changed only once (January 1, 1940). If
changes are made in this rate in the future, it will be by gradual steps,
and in accordance with an established schedule known in advance.
Therefore, this payroll tax does not have the same economic effect as
the unemployment compensation tax.
In another respect the financing of federal old-age and survivors in-
surance is different--employees contribute at the same rate as em-
ployers. Although in four states employees do make some contribu-
tions in unemployment compensation, the rates are not equal to em-
ployers', nor are there any signs of a spreading of the idea of employee
contributions to other states. The hostility of workers generally to
experience rating is likely to inhibit the development of employee
contributions in unemployment compensation so long as experience
rating exists.
There is much to be said in favor of employee contributions in un-
employment compensation; much, also, in favor of government con-
tributions, which do not now exist in the social insurances in the
United States.24 However, in the discussion in December 1944 in the
Senate on the subject of the amendment "freezing" the old-age and
survivors insurance tax for another year, there is an implication that
government contributions to the OASI program may be necessary in
the longer future. 25 In Great Britain, under the system of financing
which exists today, the costs of unemployment insurance are shared in
three equal parts by employers, workers, and the government. Under
the recent Beveridge proposals the government contribution will be
even larger, amounting to one-half the costs for the whole of social
24. The Revenue Act of 1943 does authorize a government contribution to the Bureau
of OASI if such is required to finance benefits under the system. Such a contribution is not
now and xrll not be required for some years to come even if employer and employee contribu-
tion rates remain as they are. However, eventually a government contribution of an un-
determined amount is in prospect if the Congress does not raise the employer and employee
contribution rates to a point sufficient to pay the statutory benefits.
25. In recommending legislation for freezing the ta under OASI, Senator Vandenberg
gave support to Mr. Linton's statement that "It is true that a generation hence the cocts
of old-age pensions will probably exceed the 6-percent payroll tax receipts eventually con-
templated by the present law, and that a Government subsidy to mal:e up the difference
would be needed .... Subsidies to the system of a reasonable amount are nothing to
become alarmed about."
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security. It must be recognized, of course, that in Great Britain un-
employment insurance covers a larger proportion of the workers for
much longer periods of time than in the United States; hence, there is a
somewhat greater logic in the government contribution. Also, in this
country, the government has in the past supported entirely out of
government contributions the WPA and other unemployment relief
measures. We do not yet know what the pattern of government action
will be in the postwar period, but a strong case can be made out for
government contributions to unemployment compensation, at least
under certain circumstances. I
Suggestions have been made occasionally that all payroll taxes should
be abolished and all social security and social welfare programs sup-
ported out of government contributions derived from general revenue.
Something like this is being attempted in New Zealand. There is, how-
ever, no record in any country as yet of the successful maintenance of
the social security system without the nucleus of a payroll tax as the
basis of its financing.
The variable rates introduced in unemployment compensation by
experience rating do not now reflect the results of employment stabili-
zation, nor are they likely to do so until a more settled postwar period
arises. Furthermore, experience-rating systems are now so variable
in themselves that the experience rates in the different states would
not represent the same stabilization achievements even if the system
were operating under more favorable conditions. Experience rating in
practice has confused the issue of the necessary general rate of taxation
for the system as a whole. Thinking on these issues would be clearer if
they were disentangled.
The operation of the present largely automatic experience-rating
systems in the states gives no assurance that variations in rates over a
period of time will be conducive to the best interests of the economy in
the transition from war to peace. A tax rate which remains constant
from year to year is better than one which fluctuates adversely to the
business cycle. It is possible that fluctuations in rates could be devised
which would conform more closely to the necessities of economic con-
ditions, but so far no such plan of rate making has been worked out.
On the other hand, it would probably be better economics to have
the tax rate more stable, and to absorb more of the changes in benefit
payments by greater reliance upon accumulative reserves and future
borrowing power than has been the practice in unemployment com-
pensation to date.
Benefit payments in unemployment compensation could loom as a
large factor in the postwar period even though they will never consti-
tute more than a fraction of the wage loss suffered by the unemployed.
The timing of the payments gives them more weight from an economic
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point of view than their absolute size might indicate. The fact that
they are paid only to the unemployed is a guarantee that they ,.ill be
used where they will do the most good. They do not interfere with re-
employment of a worker. They are, therefore, the most flexible and
the most effective method of meeting short-run unemployment during
depression periods.
